(This letter appears in response to the May 2007 PLoS Medicine Editorial: "How Is WHO Responding to Global Public Health Threats?" [1] )
The travels of a patient with extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) from North America to Europe and back have heightened concerns about this growing global disease problem and the possibility of its international transmission through travel. XDR-TB triggers an affi rmative answer to the decision instrument's question: "Is the public health impact of the event serious?", both because of the possibility of the event having a high public health impact and, in many instances, the need for external assistance in managing cases. XDR-TB cases would likely produce an affi rmative answer to the question: "Is the event unusual or unexpected?", because of the higher than expected case-fatality rates, particularly where XDR-TB occurs with high prevalence of HIV infection. The disease also may generate a positive answer to the question: "Is there a signifi cant risk of international travel or trade restrictions?", primarily because of the possibility of international media attention.
At present, XDR-TB would arguably not produce a clearly affi rmative answer to the question: "Is there a signifi cant risk of international spread?", because epidemiological data linking XDR-TB outbreaks and cases with the international movement of people are weak. Experience with TB, multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB), and XDR-TB demonstrates, however, that cross-border spread is a very real threat. XDR-TB has already spread from one province to several provinces in South Africa, and has in all likelihood crossed African borders, but confi rmation is delayed because of inadequate surveillance capabilities.
It remains less certain whether the WHO Director-General would determine that XDR-TB cases or outbreaks notifi ed to WHO would constitute a PHEIC. This would lead to the issuance of temporary recommendations to States Parties, which could include travel restrictions and use of compulsory measures such as quarantine or isolation. In February 2007, the WHO Global Task Force on XDR-TB argued against such a position because "the new regulations are aimed particularly to situations where there is a signifi cant risk of international spread" and that temporary recommendations "are really intended for outbreaks of acute disease, rather than the 'acute-on-chronic' situation of MDR-TB and XDR-TB" [4] .
The Global Task Force stated that, if international spread of XDR-TB were demonstrated, then standing recommendations should be considered. To some extent, the recommendations and alerts WHO has already issued on XDR-TB suggest that treating XDR-TB as a routine public health risk is not adequate. In addition, the IHR 2005 does not limit its scope of application to "acute disease" [5] . TB has never been an acute risk in the same manner as a pandemic strain of infl uenza, but history attests to TB's persistence as a lethal global threat, especially for vulnerable populations.
As the global XDR-TB problem becomes more severe, more robust and drastic public health actions may be required nationally and globally, including a declaration from the WHO Director-General of the existence of a PHEIC. A window of opportunity may exist now for effective international action to control the spread of the disease, and the IHR 2005 may provide a mechanism to help achieve this objective. A narrow, limited reading of the IHR 2005's scope of application could undermine its ability to contribute to this global health crisis.
